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A Constitutional Right to a Functioning United States
Government? Are Shutdowns Unconstitutional?
Allen E. Shoenberger*
The constitutionality of government shutdowns has never been tested
in court, nor has the constitutionality of the related Anti-Deficiency Act.
Analysis of the Act is virtually absent from published literature. This is
surprising given the increasing frequency of federal government
shutdowns.
The history behind the enactment of the Constitution clearly
demonstrates that the Framers were interested in creating an effective
government to replace the demonstratively ineffective government under
the Articles of Confederation. Closing the government created by that
endeavor is blatantly inconsistent with the intent of the Framers.
Shutdowns are fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional plan
of producing an effective, vigorous government. While the AntiDeficiency Act makes some gestures towards preserving some of the
attributes of the government during a “shutdown,” those gestures are
woefully inadequate. The Anti-Deficiency Act has its own constitutional
difficulties.
The background to the adoption of the Constitution will first be
analyzed, and then the implications for the constitutionality of the AntiDeficiency Act will be discussed. Several different constitutional
arguments will be examined, including a structural argument, the Take
Care Clause argument, the Non-Delegation Doctrine, and the Oath
argument.

I. Rebellions and Ineptitude
The problems under the Articles of Confederation are best illustrated
by Shays’s Rebellion, which came only months before the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia.1 Shays’s Rebellion occurred in New England
* John J. Waldron Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. The author
acknowledges the support of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Summer Research Stipend
Program.
1. Shays’s rebellion was frequently referenced during the convention. See 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 18, 48, 318, 406 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318, 332 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); James Madison, Preface
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because of complaints about taxation and related property foreclosures for
tax nonpayment.2 This rebellion took place shortly after a first abortive
attempt to hold a constitutional convention. However, not enough states
had sent delegates for that convention to proceed. A second convention
was called for, and partly because of Shays’s Rebellion, enough states
were now motivated to send delegates to the convention. That second
constitutional convention produced the draft constitution that was
eventually ratified.
The failure of the government under the Articles of Confederation to
respond to Shays’s Rebellion demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the
existing government. Shays’s Rebellion was only put down by the ad hoc
organization of temporary militia, paid for by voluntary contributions from
various merchants.3 That temporary militia raided the federal armory in
Springfield, Massachusetts, and with weapons from the armory put down
the rebellion.4
The national government had proved incapable of responding to the
emergency of a rebellion. Part of the reason for this inability was the
bizarre manner of exercising executive power under the Articles of
Confederation. Although a secretary of war had been appointed, that
person could only act under directions of a committee of the Congress.
The secretaries were effectively ‘clerks’ with Congress micromanaging
everything.5 In fact, “John Jay pronounced Congress ‘unequal’ to the task
of wielding the executive power.”6

to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 539,
547 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). After discussing the Annapolis meeting Madison stated: “[T]he ripening
incidents [between the Annapolis convention and the meeting of the delegates in Philadelphia] was
the Insurrection of Shays in Massts. against her Govt; which was with difficulty suppressed,
notwithstanding the influence on the insurgents of an apprehended interposition of the Fedl. troops.”
Id. at 547. No federal troops were ever involved.
2. Shays’ Rebellion, U.S. HISTORY, www.ushistory.org/us/15a.asp (last visited Sept. 30,
2020).
3. Id.
4. General Shepard had taken possession of the armory under orders from Governor Bowdoin,
and he used its arsenal to arm a militia force of 1,200. He had done this despite the fact that the armory
was federal property, not state, and he did not have permission from Secretary of War Henry Knox.
LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE 27-28
(2002); see also JOSIAH GILBERT HOLLAND, 1 HISTORY OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS 285-86
(Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 1855).
5. Although the armory had been created by the government under the Articles of
Confederation, no permission was received from the Secretary of War. See RICHARDS, supra note 4;
HOLLAND, supra note 4.
6. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 115 (2015) (ebook).
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In sharp contrast, under the subsequently adopted Constitution,
President George Washington promptly marshalled three states’ militias
and put down the next rebellion—the Whiskey Rebellion. The Whiskey
Rebellion was also a tax protest, involving a tax of six cents a gallon for
major whiskey producers, but nine cents a gallon for small producers.7 The
small producers were mostly west of the Appalachian Mountains. These
producers protested, including by tarring and feathering federal tax
collectors. President Washington called up the militias of three states and
led them towards western Pennsylvania from Philadelphia—the capital.8
That rebellion was quickly put down with no major confrontations and no
serious bloodshed.
The next rebellion was the American Civil War. The pattern of
rebellions almost every five years after independence was broken by
Washington’s prompt, effective action, thereby demonstrating that the
new federal government could and would act.

II. Defects under the Articles of Confederation
Many of the defects of the national government under the Articles of
Confederation were described by James Madison in his pamphlet, Vices of
the Political System of the United States.9 The want of sanctions by the
Government of the Confederacy was among those defects listed. 10
Encroachments by the states on the federal authority, the laws of nations,
and the rights of other states figured prominently in Madison’s
complaints.11 Madison also mentioned the want of a guaranty of the states
and their constitutions against internal violence.12 In a letter of Madison’s
7. Id.
8. The whiskey tax had been proposed by Alexander Hamilton as a tax on a luxury item.
Washington was concerned about the reaction to the tax but polled various producers of whiskey and
found they would accept it willingly. It helped that for major producers, the tax could even be lower.
However, he obviously failed to seek the sentiment of producers from the west of the United States,
which used whiskey as a substitute for currency and was a useful way of transporting crops from the
west to eastern markets. The tax was ultimately repealed under the Jefferson administration, and the
federal government subsequently relied on customs duties. This was the first and only time an
American President went off to battle leading troops. Subsequently the capital moved to Washington,
D.C.
Peter
Kotowski,
Whiskey
Rebellion,
MOUNT
VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/whiskey-rebellion/
(last visited Sept. 30, 2020); Whiskey Rebellion, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/earlyus/whiskey-rebellion (last updated Sept. 13, 2019).
9. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in 1
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 166–69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
10. Id. at 167.
11. Id.
12. Id. Shays’s Rebellion was not mentioned. The rebellion effectively ended February 3–4 of
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to George Washington of April 16, 1787, about the potential contents of a
new national constitution, Madison states, “An article should be inserted
expressly guarantying the tranquility of the States against internal as well
as external dangers.”13 It is clear that Madison was referencing Shays’s
Rebellion.
Want of power in Congress was perceived as a problem. Such
concerns were shared by many leaders of the time. Richard Henry Lee
mentions that want of power in a letter to George Mason of May 15, 1787:
“[T]he cry is power, give Congress power.”14
Lack of an ability to raise and spend money was one of the major
problems for the government under the Confederation. Edward Carrington
echoed this refrain, and specifically referenced “the late tumults in
Massachusetts,” as well as the “[d]elinquencies of the States in their
foederal [sic] obligations.”15 Carrington went on, “Our tendency to
anarchy and consequent despotism is felt, and the alarm is spreading.”16
Prior to the height of the outbreak in Massachusetts, John Jay wrote to
Jefferson:
The inefficacy of our government becomes daily more and more
apparent. Our treasury and our credit are in a sad situation; and it is
probable that either the wisdom or the passions of the people will
produce changes. A spirit of licentiousness has infected Massachusetts,
which appears more formidable than some at first apprehended.17

Jay specifically identified as a problem “[a] reluctance to taxes.”18
Earlier that same year, Rufus King wrote to Eldridge Gerry about the sad
state of the representation of the states in Congress. He went on to state,
“We are without money or the prospect of it in the Federal Treasury; and
the States, many of them, care so little about the Union, that they take no
measures to keep a representation in Congress.”19
1787—only months before Madison’s writing. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 97 (2005).
13. James Madison to George Washington, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,
supra note 9, at 251.
14. Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (May 15, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 170. Lee goes on to warn about excessive grants of power, “that every
free nation . . . has lost its liberty by the same rash impatience . . . .” Id.
15. Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson (June 9, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 171.
16. Id.
17. John Jay to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 27, 1786), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 164–65.
18. Id. at 165.
19. Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 30, 1786), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
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Under the Articles, the Continental Congress could make treaties, as
well as declare war and send and receive ambassadors. When that proved
ineffective, Congress created a Department of Foreign affairs, headed by
a single officer. But because the secretary was a ‘clerk’ this measure was
a failure. The “clerk,” John Jay, himself complained decrying the plight of
hostages and in a letter to Washington said Congress was unequal to the
task of wielding executive power and that Congress could never act with
vigor and dispatch.20
The history is quite clear. Want of an effective national government,
adequately funded, with an ability to act was a prime mover of those
leaders who wanted a new form of government at the national level. It is
fair to state that this desire underpins the entire constitution that emerged
in September of 1787. For those who hold that Founders’ intent should be
a major interpretative touchstone for our Constitution, this desire for an
effective government deserves recognition at the highest level.21

III. The Drafting of the Constitution
After the proposal of the draft constitution, the theme of the need for
an energetic government (i.e. one that worked) continued. Alexander
Hamilton stated, “[I]f we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and
duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States
in their collective capacities.”22 James Madison echoed that message in a
letter to Thomas Jefferson stating, “This ground-work23 being laid, the
great objects which presented themselves were . . . to unite a proper energy
in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislative
departments . . . .”24
During the ratification convention in Pennsylvania, James Wilson
stated regarding the President:
We secure vigor. We well know what numerous executives are. We
know there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility, in them. Add to
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 162.
20. PRAKASH, supra note 6.
21. The very first sentence of Federalist Paper No. 1 is: “After an unequivocal experience of
the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new
Constitution for the United States of America.” THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 1, at 49 (Alexander
Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866).
22. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 305.
23. Drafting of the Constitution.
24. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 644.
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all this, that officer is placed high, and is possessed of power far from
being contemptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character;
far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private
character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.25

In Federalist No. 70 Hamilton wrote, “Energy in the executive is a
leading character . . . of good government. It is essential to the protection
of community against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady
administration of the laws . . . .”26
A. The Take Care Clause
The Take Care Clause of the Constitution is also significant, for it
mandates the most specific duty of the President.27 During the
Constitutional Convention little time was spent discussing it. The clause
was drafted in the committee of style to read: “[H]e shall take care that the
laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed . . . .”28 That draft
was a minor rewrite of the language that emerged from the Committee of
Detail: “It shall be his duty to provide for the due & faithful exec—of the
Laws of the United States (be faithfully executed) to the best of his
ability.”29 The changes have been described as follows:
The changes . . . altered law execution in two important ways. First,
they made law execution a duty and not merely a power. . . .
Second, the Committee of Detail draft substituted a passive
construction to describe law execution (that the laws “be faithfully
executed”), which indicates its expectation that the President would
oversee the execution of the law by others, rather than do it personally.30

The Convention then discussed the report of the Committee of Detail,
but the basic structure of the powers of the presidency, as set forth by the
Committee of Detail, went unquestioned.31
25. James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 501 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).
26. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 506.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
28. Records of the Federal Convention, reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 125
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).
29. Id. at 124–25.
30. Michael W. McConnell, James Wilson’s Contributions to the Construction of Article II, 17
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 43 (2019). James Wilson was a member of the five-member committee
of Detail. The most detailed information we have regarding the workings of the Committee of Detail
comes from Wilson’s papers, but his own draft of Article II was not contained in those papers.
31. Id. at 46.
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After the government commenced functioning under the new
Constitution, William Rawle expressed an early view of the clause:
“The president shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed.”
The simplicity of the language accords with the general character of the
instrument. It declares what is his duty, and it gives him no power beyond
it. The Constitution, treaties, and acts of congress, are declared to be the
supreme law of the land. He is bound to enforce them; if he attempts to
carry his power further, he violates the Constitution.32

The Supreme Court has dealt with the Take Care Clause in a number
of cases but has never explored its origin in any depth. They have held
under the clause that the President had authority to appoint a guard to
protect Justice Fields of the Supreme Court33 and to discharge a postmaster
from his office.34 On the other hand, the President could not discharge a
Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission35 nor authorize the
seizure of steel mills during wartime.36 In none of these cases did the
opinions employ substantial investigation into the origins of the Take Care
Clause.
Indeed, Jack Goldsmith and John F. Manning state the following:
Two things stand out about the Court’s reliance on the Take Care
Clause . . . . The first is that . . . the Court treats the meaning of the clause
as obvious when it is anything but that. The Court’s decisions rely
heavily on the Take Clare Clause but almost never interpret it, at least
not in any conventional way. . . .
The second striking element is that the functions that the Court
ascribes to the Take Care Clause are often in unacknowledged tension
with one another. For instance, deriving a strong prosecutorial discretion
from the clause may collide with the scruple against dispensation 37 that
the Court also reads into it. Similarly, the Court has said that the Take
Care Clause precludes presidential lawmaking while also finding that the
clause justifies the exercise of a presidential completion power—an

32. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States (1829), reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 129 (emphasis added).
33. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
35. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
36. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
37. Dispensation is the power to omit the execution of a law or, in other words, to dispense
with its application. It was one of the royal prerogatives that was deliberately not given to the President
in the Constitution.
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implied presidential authority to prescribe extrastatutory means when
necessary to execute a statute.38

The history of the clause has been thoroughly traced though a seminal
article by Kent, Leib, and Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II.39
The authors sum up their extensive research:
We contend that it imposed three interrelated requirements on
officeholders: (1) a duty not to act ultra vires, beyond the scope of one’s
office; (2) a duty not to misuse an office’s funds or take unauthorized
profits; and (3) diligent, careful, good faith, honest, and impartial
execution of law or office.40

They found that “take care” references have a long history in English
jurisprudence. One reference is particularly trenchant in the instant case:
Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the fifteenth
century, attribute[d] England’s “excellent Constitution” in part to the fact
that the king “is circumscribed with Laws which are calculated for the
good of the Subject . . . that is, to take care that the Laws be duly put in
Execution, and that Right be done.”41

The word “faithfully” was particularly important in that history.
“[F]aithful was linked with words such as diligent, honest, due, careful,
impartial, and skillful, suggesting an affirmative duty.”42
The oath43 required of the President by Article II includes a promise
to “faithfully execute the office of President,” and as Kent et al. conclude:
The oath or command of faithful execution to an officeholder came to
convey an affirmative duty to act diligently, honestly, skillfully, and
impartially in the best interest of the public, a restraint against selfdealing and corruption, and a reminder that officeholders must stay
within the authorization of the law and office.44

Kent et al. assert that “the record we uncovered cuts against
presidential nonexecution on the basis of independent constitutional
interpretation.”45 Moreover, they conclude that “[t]he Faithful Execution
38. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1838 (2016) (footnotes omitted).
39. Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article
II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019).
40. Id. at 2112.
41. Id. at 2136 (quoting JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 133 (John Selden
trans., London, 1775)).
42. Id. at 2146.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
44. Kent et al., supra note 39, at 2141.
45. Id. at 2186.
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Clauses . . . underscore that ‘[t]he Constitution does not confer upon [the
President] any power to enact laws or to suspend or repeal such as the
Congress enacts.’”46
In other words, the President has no discretion to not enforce laws
enacted by Congress, nor does he have discretion to pick and choose
among them: his duty is to faithfully enforce them all.

IV. What Then Are the President’s Duties When Congress
Has Failed to Pass a Budget?
Government shutdowns are a relatively recent phenomenon. Although
Congress enacted the Anti-Deficiency Act in 1884, broad shutdowns did
not occur until after a set of legal opinions were issued in 1980 and 1981
by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti which stated that the absence of
funding required a government shutdown.47 These opinions did not
consider any potential constitutional issue regarding shutdowns, but only
whether statutory provisions applied including the Anti-Deficiency Act.
In neither Attorney General opinion was any consideration paid to whether
the Constitution controlled, or indeed, whether the Anti-Deficiency Act
might itself be unconstitutional. Only after these opinions did government
shutdowns become somewhat routine.
It has become customary that after a shutdown, all governmental
employees are paid for their wages lost during the shutdown. Only
government contractors end up suffering financial loss from a shutdown
but everyone is betrayed. However, as a result of 2019 amendments, the
Anti-Deficiency Act now mandates payments to any federal employees or
District of Columbia employees who are furloughed as a result of a
shutdown, and any employees who are required to work are also to be
paid.48 What had been custom has now become law. In effect, furloughed
government employees now receive paid vacations for workdays that they
are prohibited from working, although the payments are subject to
“enactment of appropriations Acts ending the lapse.”49

46. Id. at 2187.
47. Authority for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 1 (1981); Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in
an Agency’s Appropriation, 4A Op. Att’y Gen. 16 (1980).
48. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2) (2018).
49. Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116–1, 133 Stat. 3 (2019);
Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116–5, 133 Stat. 10 (2019)
(underlying policy for this statutory change is unclear).
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Does the Anti-Deficiency Act authorize the President to shut down
parts of the government? The short answer is that it can only do so if the
Anti-Deficiency Act is itself constitutional. However, the apparent conflict
with the basic purpose of the adoption of the Constitution—to produce an
effective, vigorous government—suggests otherwise. Since the Attorney
General opinions that underpin government shutdowns failed to consider
any constitutional issue, this remains an open question. The AntiDeficiency Act prohibition is associated with both a civil penalty50 and
with criminal penalties.51
The statute permits exceptions when public safety or property
protection is implicated or emergency service is involved.52 The Office of
Personnel Management of the federal government or the appropriate
District of Columbia public employer may designate an employee as
exempted from the act and thus permitted to work. This process has not
always worked well. For example, in one reported case a convicted cop
killer escaped from custody because of a shutdown under Reagan and the
removal of his experienced prison guards.53 More recently, in connection
with the Boeing Max 747 crashes, a government shutdown delayed FAA
approval of a fix to the operating system of the airplanes—a fix that might
have prevented the second Max 747 crash and thus the deaths of 157
people.54 Certification delays by the FAA also delayed Delta Airlines’
ability to utilize brand-new Airbus A220 jets.55 It is clear that no one can
fully foresee the consequences of shutting down any part of the

50. 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (2018) (indicating potential removal from office).
51. 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018) (declaring a fine up to $5000 and imprisonment for up to two
years or both). In one of the few cases that mention the Anti-Deficiency Act, District Judge Smalkin
stated: “[T]he court should not order such an expenditure . . . and if it were to do so, the undersigned
judge could conceivably be open to criminal prosecution . . . , a situation that might mildly amuse
some, but which ought to be avoided, if possible.” U.S. v. Nave, 733 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (D. Md.
1990).
52. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018).
53. Deanna Paul, A Government Shutdown Once Allowed a Convicted Cop Killer to Escape
Prison.
Here’s
How.,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Jan.
11,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/11/previous-government-shutdown-allowedconvicted-cop-killer-escape-prison-heres-how/. His experienced guards were recalled from the
hospital to the prison. An unarmed teenager was left to guard him; the means of his escape is unknown.
54. Heather Timmons, Ethiopian Airlines Crash Came After US Shutdown Delayed Boeing
737 Max Fixes, QZ.COM (March 12, 2019), https://qz.com/1570266/ethiopian-airlines-crash-usshutdown-delayed-boeing-737-max-fixes/. The airline pilots’ union sent two letters—one Jan. 2, 2019
and the other Jan. 10, 2019—warning the President of the dangers associated with the shutdown in
airline production and monitoring. Both the House and Senate leaders were also warned.
55. Ben Walsh, Delta Air Lines Says the Government Shutdown is Costing It Millions,
BARRONS (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/delta-airlines-earnings-governmentshutdown-51547565791.

28

19] A Constitutional Right to a Functioning United States Government?
government. It is also worth noting that since the issuance of Civiletti’s
opinions, the federal government has been shut down for a total of 162
days, or nearly 5 ½ months. 56 This is not an inconsequential amount of
time for large segments of the federal government not to be functioning.
To assume this is inconsequential blinks reality.

V. The Take Care Clause
As seen above, the Take Care Clause requires the President to exercise
diligent, careful, good faith, honest, and impartial execution of his office
and ensure that the law is carried out. Since the Framers distinctly refused
to extend the Dispensation power to the President, the President has no
power under the Constitution to distinguish between the laws that are to
be enforced. Only if Congress gives him power to suspend a law (assuming
that Congress itself has the power to do so) can any such distinction be
drawn. But any such delegation may run afoul of the doctrine of Excessive
Delegation of Legislative Power.

VI. Excessive Delegation of Legislative Power
Only two cases exist in which the Supreme Court has held that an
excessive delegation of legislative power was attempted by Congress:
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan57 and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.58 In
neither did Congress attempt anything as broad as it did in the AntiDeficiency Act. Moreover, in neither of those cases did Congress arguably
grant the President broad power not only not granted, but rejected, by the
Framers of the Constitution. Only a single narrow suspension power was
granted in the Constitution, and that was to Congress, i.e., the power to
suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the

56. Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gate & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was the Longest
Ever.
Here’s
the
History.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html.
57. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Congress had given the President the
power to criminalize shipment of oil beyond that permitted by an extraction state without specifying
any standards for the President’s actions.
58. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The President had
been given power to promulgate codes of fair competition drawn up by private commercial groups.
The cases require that discretion be “canalized within banks.” The exceptions in the Anti-Defamation
Act for public safety or property protection are incredibly broad. Arguably anything related to property
or safety, which would include any defense related or foreign affairs related matter, as well as
commerce related including the FAA, the FTC, the FCC, the FDA, the Justice Department, the Bureau
of Prisons, the Coast Guard, and even the National Forests and National Parks potentially fit within
these “exceptions.” For all intents and purposes the discretion is boundless.
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public Safety may require it.”59 To be sure, Congress was further
commanded not to draw money from the Treasury except through
Appropriations by Law but that was a Constitutional command to
Congress not to the President.60
The history involving the English King’s suspension power
controversy culminated with Parliament’s enactment of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689 which declared both the exercise of dispensing power and
suspending power illegal.61 This was well known to many of the Framers
of our Constitution. The state delegations to the Constitutional Convention
unanimously vetoed the idea that the President would have the power to
suspend the laws.62
The question then boils down to this: Does Congress have the power
to delegate to the President the power to suspend laws without itself
violating the Article II Constitutional text that commands that the
President take care that the laws be faithfully executed? Moreover, the
question is not whether Congress’s power of the purse can be employed.
The questions of whether executive agents may continue to do their jobs
executing the law, and whether they can also be paid for their service are
distinct.63 To be sure, Congress is further commanded not to draw money
from the Treasury except through Appropriations by Law, but nowhere in
that clause is there a hint that Congress can impede the President’s Article
II power and duty to see the laws be faithfully executed.64

VII. The Oaths
There are two oath clauses in the Constitution. One is the Presidential
Oath contained in Article II: “execute the Office of President of the United
States, and . . . to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.”65 The second oath clause is in Article
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
60. Id. (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.”).
61. BILL OF RIGHTS, (1688) 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (U.K.) (“Dispensing Power. That the
pretended Power of Suspending of Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authority without
Consent of Parliament is illegal. Late dispensing Power. That the pretended Power of Dispensing with
Laws or the Execution of Laws by Regall Authoritie as it hath beene assumed and exercised of late is
illegall.”).
62. James Madison, 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS OF 1787, supra note 1,
at 103–04.
63. Indeed, at the present time, the only issue is when they can be paid, not whether.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See supra text accompanying note 61.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. The last clause provides the text of the oath: “I do solemnly
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VI—applicable to Senators and Representatives, Members of the several
State Legislatures as well as to all executive and judicial officers both of
the United States and of the several States. The second oath is more
succinct: “to support this Constitution.” 66 While this second oath provision
is seldom the subject of litigation, it must be remembered that each
executive branch official who has taken this oath, is independently and
directly bound by the Constitution, and thus, not subject only to
Presidential directions. Each executive official is subject to the laws of the
United States as well.
It is fair to say that today we place little credence on oath taking.
However, that has not always been the case. During the early period of
common law, an accused person was not permitted to testify on their own
behalf, for that would require taking an oath, and breaking an oath
condemned that person’s soul to damnation. It was presumed that anyone
accused would lie.67
The history of the requirement of oath taking and its meaning in 17 th
century England is traced in Faithful Execution and Article II.68
Blackstone summarized the convoluted history by stating that “English
law imposed ‘a limitation [on] the king’s prerogative,’ which was ‘a guard
upon the executive power, by restraining it from acting either beyond or
in contradiction to the laws.’”69 Subsequent to the Glorious Revolution,
“Parliament specif[ied] new, simpler versions of the oaths of allegiance
and supremacy . . . [which in] the coronation oath now also required
upholding the ‘Protestant Reformed Religion Established by Law,’ further
cementing the Anglican basis of England’s monarchy and government
class, and making the upholding of statutory law and the established
Protestant church keys to the monarch’s execution of office.”70
Oaths including pledges of faithful execution were frequently required
in the early era of the English colonization of the new world. Besides
requirements that public officials subscribe to oaths, even incorporated
churches required oaths of faithful execution by vestrymen and other

swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to
the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Id.
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
67. “It was considered certain that the defendant’s fear of punishment, whether he was guilty
or innocent, would cause him to perjure himself, and to avoid this, he was not allowed to testify.”
Robert Popper, History and Development of the Accused’s Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U. L. Q. 454,
456 (1962) (citing 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 903 (10th ed. 1912)).
68. Kent et al., supra note 39, at 2149–62.
69. Id. at 2159 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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officials.71 In every colony the assembly created offices and specified by
oath or command that officeholders were bound to faithfully execute
them.72 Such officials numbered in the hundreds, from gagers of casks,
managers of public lotteries, treasurers, and town clerks, to sergeants
major of the militia. The list goes on and on.73 Faithful execution was
consistent with staying within authority, abiding by the law, following the
intent of the lawgiver, and eschewing self-dealing and financial
corruption.74 Both civil and criminal law as well as parliamentary
impeachments helped to define faithfulness in office.75 Civil actions
included actions to remove a person from office.76
The Framers of the Constitution were thus well acquainted with not
only oaths but requirements of faithfulness and with the potential
consequences for breaches of duties ascribed to officeholders. “By the
eighteenth century, faithful execution was widely used to describe the
proper role of a magistrate—to duly, impartially, and vigorously execute
the laws.”77 “[O]aths of allegiance and faithful execution for state
officials” were among the first things done by the newly independent state
governments.78 Each of the states required its chief magistrate be under
oath to faithfully execute the office, abide by and faithfully apply the law,
and had no power to suspend the laws or to dispense with their application
to specific persons.79 The Continental Congress also imposed similar oaths
and bonds for faithful execution of offices throughout its existence. John
Jay, for example, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs took an oath of fidelity
to the United States and an oath “for the faithful execution” of his trust.80
Indeed, future delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Elbridge Gerry,
Gouverneur Morris, John Rutledge, James Madison, Roger Sherman,
Hugh Williamson, and John Dickinson had each drafted “resolves,” or
resolutions, of the Congress imposing oaths of faithful execution.81
With that background, the command that both the President and each
executive official of the federal government by oath should faithfully

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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Id.
Id. at 2166–68.
Id. at 2169.
Id. at 2170.
Id. at 2171.
Id. at 2172.
Id.
Id. at 2175–76.
Id. at 2177.
Id. at 2178 (footnote omitted).
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execute their offices is plain. Neither can any official, President included,
claim any power to suspend or dispense with the laws. All of these officials
have fiduciary duties to execute the laws. Members of Congress also are
bound by an oath, and only if they have some granted power to suspend
the laws may they do so. It is submitted that nowhere in Article I, Section
8 is such a power included, and indeed, the fact that a single suspension
power is granted (with restrictions) in Article IX suggests that Congress
simply has no such power under the Constitution. Moreover, the AntiDeficiency Act stands in stark opposition to the motivating thrust of the
Framers of the Constitution: a demand for an effective, active government
at the federal level.

VIII. Conclusion
It is clear that several serious constitutional problems exist with regard
to the Anti-Deficiency Act. First, it apparently violates the structural
implications of the underlying reasons for the adoption of the Constitution.
Second, it arguably violates the Take Care Clause of Article II in
interfering with the President’s constitutional duties. Third, the AntiDeficiency Act is arguably an excessive delegation of legislative power, a
delegation of power so sweeping as to be beyond any President’s power
to manage either by him or herself or as delegated to the executive branch
Office of Professional Management. Fourth, it appears blatantly
inconsistent with the promise to the American people of an effective
government to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare and secure the
Blessings of Liberty.”82
Government employees should thus continue to perform their legally
mandated functions despite a failure of authorized appropriations. When
they will get paid is a separate matter and since their eventual payment is
now guaranteed by statute once the funding crisis is resolved, there is
simply no excuse for failure to perform.83 Some politicians may rue the
lack of the political tool of government shutdowns, but the Constitution
was adopted with greater purposes in mind. In the words of Alexander

82. U.S. CONST. pmbl. A former colleague of mine, George Anastaplo, believed that the
preamble to the U.S. Constitution was woefully unrecognized for its importance. See George
Anastaplo, Two “Preambles” for the Preamble of the Constitution of 1787, George Anastoplo’s Blog
(Oct. 8, 2013), https://anastaplo.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/two-preambles-for-the-preamble-of-theconstitution-of-1787/.
83. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203, commands timely payments by
employers, but does not apply to the federal government, so nonpayment does not violate federal law.
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Hamilton, “[T]he vigor of government is essential to the security of
liberty.”84

84. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 1, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1866).
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